NSFC“计量建模与经济政策研究”基础科学中心学术交流报告会第九讲
Firm's knowledge acquisition during a product defect investigation
沈鹏,厦门大学管理学院市场学系助理教授。于2021年7月毕业于印第安纳大学,获得经济学哲学博士学位。研究领域包括实证市场营销战略,应用计量经济学,主要关注产品召回管理,产业监管政策,以及公司创新。研究情景集中于汽车产业和医疗设备产业。
2023年6月8日(周四),12:00-13:30
Business press and public safety advocates often accuse product manufacturers of taking too long to investigate a potential product defect and initiate a recall, should the defect be confirmed. These stakeholders have demanded that the relevant regulator open its parallel investigation of the defect. Such demands assume that the regulator’s parallel investigation can influence the manufacturer, expediting the manufacturer’s recall (i.e., an "influenced recall") completion. Our research uses a sample of 2100 recalls initiated in the U.S. and provides empirical evidence against this assumption, that is, the regulatory defect investigation will delay the firm’s recall process.
Furthermore, we investigate the detailed mechanisms of this delaying effect. To do so, we first collect the textual narratives of 1,442 defect investigation reports by 20 vehicle manufacturers during 2011–2018. We provide a novel measure of the manufacturer’s knowledge gained during the defect investigation. We show that the manufacturer gains more knowledge when the regulatory influence during the investigation is low, and this more knowledge gained in the investigation accelerates the manufacturer's repair of the recalled vehicles.