NSFC“计量建模与经济政策研究”基础科学中心学术交流报告会第八讲
报告题目：The Politics of (No) Compromise: Information Acquisition, Policy Discretion, and Reputation
报告人：刘立群，2021年在芝加哥大学哈里斯公共政策学院获得博士学位，至今就任于厦门大学公共事务学院。主要研究方向是用博弈论的方法研究社会治理的相关问题。
时间：2023年5月11日（周四），12:00-13:30
地点：经济楼A117
摘要：Precise information is essential for making good policies, especially those regarding reform decisions. However, decision-makers may hesitate to gather such information if certain decisions could have negative impacts on their future careers. We model how decision-makers with career concerns may acquire policy-relevant information and carry out reform decisions when their policy discretion can be limited ex ante. Typically, decision-makers with career concerns have weaker incentives to acquire information compared to decision-makers without such concerns. In this context, we demonstrate that the public can encourage information acquisition by eliminating either the "moderate policy'' or the status quo from decision-makers' discretion. We also analyze when reform decisions should be strategically delegated to decision-makers with or without career concerns.
