报告题目：Social Learning and Strategic Pricing
主讲嘉宾：Kong-Pin Chen is a Distinguished Research Fellow of the Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica. His has a broad research interests and extensive publications in political science (Journal of Politics etc.), law (Journal of Legal Studies, Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization etc.) and, in particular, economics, including publications in economic theory (Journal of Economic Theory, Games and Economic Behavior, Rand Journal of Economics, etc.), labor economics (Journal of Labor Economics etc.) and industrial economics (International Economic Review, Journal of Industrial Economics etc.).
He also has extensive administrative experiences, for which he has served as the Director of the Research Institute of Social Sciences and Humanities (Academia Sinica), Director of the Institute of Economics (Academia Sinica), President of the Asian Law and Economic Association, and President of the Taiwan Economic Association. He has been an exchange scholar to the British Academy, and to École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales. His has also been a visiting Professor in the Department of Political Science of Duke University, and a visiting scholar in the Economics Department, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology.
报告摘要：Despite widespread use in online transactions, rating systems only provide summary statistics of buyers' diverse opinions at best. To investigate the consequences of this coarse form of information aggregation, we consider a dynamic lemons market in which buyers share their evaluations anonymously through a rating system. When the buyers have diverse preferences, the value of a good rating depends endogenously on the seller's pricing strategy, which in turn creates complicated dynamic interactions and results in stochastic price fluctuations. Occasional flash sales induced by the rating system yield a non-trivial welfare effect that stands in sharp contrast to standard adverse selection models: all buyers are weakly better off with information asymmetry than without. Incentivizing buyers to leave ratings may backfire by exacerbating the seller's strategic pricing incentives.
报告时间：2023年05月12日(周五)，16:30-18:00
线下地点：厦门大学经济楼N302、中科院数学与系统科学研究院南楼N204
线上地点：腾讯会议ID：653 988 428
